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Abstract
Albuquerque,  Loayza,  and Serven analyze the  full sample of countries,  the globalization  measure  rose
unparalleled  increase in foreign direct investment to  eightfold from 1985  to 1999.  Furthermore,  in  recent
emerging market economies  in the past 25  years. Using a  years developing countries'  exposure to global factors
large cross-country timeseries data set,  the authors  has approached that of industrial countries, particularly
evaluate  the dependence  of foreign direct investment on  for Latin America.  Finally, the globalization  measure
global factors or worldwide  sources of risk (that is,  correlates  strongly with measures of capital market
factors that drive foreign direct investment across  several  liberalization.  Overall the authors  find strong support for
countries).  They construct  a globalization  measure that  the hypothesis  of increased market integration which
equals the share of explained variation in direct  implies a greater role for worldwide sources  of risk. They
investment attributable  to global factors.  The authors  discuss the implications of the results for public policies
show that the globalization  measure has increased  regarding  capital market  liberalization and policies
steadily  for industrial  and developing countries.  For the  directed  at attracting foreign investment.
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Recently,  there has been a strong move towards greater integration of emerging market
economies into world capital markets.  The process -of integration starts with the removal
of capital market restrictions,  most notably the liberalization of foreign investors' partic-
ipation in domestic stock  markets,  the listing of domestic  firms  in foreign markets,  and
the privatization of state-owned companies. I Among the main goals of these reforms are
a reduction  in the domestic  cost of capital and an increase  in foreign capital  inflows.2
There  is  by now a substantial body of empirical evidence  on how the  cost of capital
responds to a financial liberalization program.  The consensus view from that literature is
that the cost of capital declines in the post liberalization era.  However,  this decline is not
as large as theory would have predicted, sometimes not even economically  or statistically
significant.3
This paper  analyzes  the dynamics  of foreign  capital  flows  in  response to increased
integration  of capital  markets.  Our  focus  on flows  rather  than  prices  has  two  main
objectives.  First  and  foremost,  the success and continuity  of the liberalization  reforms
depend on the  benefits  of such programs,  which on the basis of the current  evidence  on
prices  might  be viewed  as  meager  by reform  opponents.  Of course,  it is possible that
the noted small price impact also reflects the reforms' imperfect credibility.  Ift hat is the
case, one would expect flows to behave in a fashion similar to prices, otherwise one would
expect  flows to increase  significantly.  Looking  at the behavior of flows  thus may prove
important  to  distinguish  between  theories  that  attempt  to explain  the small  observed
price changes  after the liberalization.  Second,  not much is known about the dynamics of
international capital flows  in connection with the recent period  of global capital market
'See  for example  Bekaert,  Harvey  and Lumsdaine  (2001), Marston  (1995),  and Stulz  (1999a).  Beim
and Calomiris  (2001)  report  official  dates  of financial  liberalization  measures  and  other reforms across
several countries.
2For  example,  Errunlza  and  Losq  (1985)  and Bacchetta  and  van Wincoop  (2000)  give  theoretical
arguments  for these effects to  occur.
3See Bekaert and Harvey  (2000),  Henry  (2000), Chari and Henry  (2002),  and Stulz (1999b).integration.4
We choose to analyze the behavior  of direct investment  flows  as opposed to portfolio
equity  flows,  or  total capital  flows.  This  is  done  for  several  reasons.  First,  foreign
direct  investment  is the fastest growing  form of international capital flows  and the most
important  form  of private international  financing  for emerging  market  economies.5 To
the extent  that  multinationals  are vehicles  for improving  risk sharing  across  countries
(e.g.  Errunza,  Hogan and Hung 1999, and Rowland  and Tesar 2000), they may be partly
responsible  for  the small price  response  of domestically  listed  firms  after  stock  market
liberalizations.
Second,  low portfolio  equity  inflows  may  be  a reflection  of the  weak  development
of the  domestic  capital  markets  as  opposed  to  a  lack  of interest  in  pursuing  greater
diversification  by foreign investors.  In fact,  many local companies  in liberalizing countries
have  chosen  to list elsewhere  in  order to reach  foreign investors  directly  in their  home
market.  In contrast,  while  in many  ways foreign direct  investment  behaves as equity,  it
does  not rely exclusively  on the  existence of developed  domestic  stock markets.  Third,
many  foreign  investors might choose to invest  in emerging economies'  equity by  trading
on country funds or ADRs listed in the New York or London markets.  While the existence
of these assets  allows  for  the desired risk sharing  (see Errunza,  Hogan and Hung  1999),
it also  makes  it difficult  to track  portfolio  capital flows across  countries.  This criticism
is particularly relevant  for the vastly used US Treasury International  Capital dataset.
Our analysis  relates the driving factors  of foreign  direct investment  to the  observed
increased  integration  of capital  markets.  To  motivate  this connection  we  argue  that
'A  recent  study  by  Bekaert,  Harvey  and Lumsdaine  (2002)  finds that  after  a liberalization  equity
flows  increase by  an  annualized rate of 1.4%  of market capitalization,  but drop  3 years  after by 0.55%.
5As a fraction of world gross domestic product, total private  capital inflows to emerging markets grew
from  a steady  annual average  of 1.3  percent  in  the period from  1976 to  1989 to an  annual average  of
2.0  percent  in the period  from  1990 to 2000,  representing  a 56  percent  increase.  In this  process foreign
direct  investment  flows  increased  significantly  more  than  portfolio  equity or bond flow's.  The  average
annualized  growth  rate  of foreign  direct  investment  was  17  percent  in  the period  from  1976t  o  2000
whereas the corresponding  figure  for  all  private  non-direct  investment  flows  was  7.6 percent  (authors'
computations  using  data from the World  Bank World  Development  Indicators  2002  for  low and middle
income countries).
2increased integration brings the world economy closer to an equilibrium with perfect risk
sharing.  In the polar  case of perfect risk sharing only aggregate  or global risk matters,
because risk from local factors can be diversified away.  This means that domestic returns,
wage  and  interest  rates,  and  consumption  all  depend  only  on  global  factors.  In the
opposite extreme  polar  case of fully  segmented  capital markets,  investors  can only hold
their own country's assets and must bear  allt he risk from local factors.  Thus,  domestic
prices and quantities depend  only on local  factors,  and trivially,  in this polar case there
are  no  international  capital  flows.  In  the  morie  realistic  intermediate case  of partially
segmented  capital  markets,  local  and  global  risk  factors  impact  domestic  prices  and
quantities as well as the derisions of foreign (and domestic)  investors.
*  We  build an empirical  model  of foreign direct  investment  that  nests several  theories
and  estimate  it  using a large  cross  section  and time series  data set  of developing  and
developed  countries.  Particular  care is  put  in  identifying  and  motivating  the  role  of
global  and local  factors  as  drivers  of direct  investment.  Global  factors  cause  foreign
direct  investment  to change across  several  countries,  whereas local  factors  are  country-
specific  and  have  no  direct  or indirect  impact  on foreign  direct  investment  into other
countries.6 To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that studies the relevance
of global  factors  as determinants  of foreign  direct investment.
We proceed  by estimating  the exposure  of countries,  and  the  level of direct  invest-
ment, to global factors.  To do this we  construct  a measure oft he explained  variance  in
foreign direct investment  that  is due to variation  in the global factors.  This we call  the
globalization  measure.  To construct  the globalization  measure  we make  the identifying
assumption that each country is small relative to the world economy,  which implies that
local factors  may  have  a global  component  themselves,  but the reverse  is not  true,  i.e.,
there is  no feedback  from  local  factors  to global  factors.  Our  empirical  approach  uses
6In related  literature Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart  (1993),  Fernandez-Arias  (1996), and Calvo and
Reinhart  (1996)  analyze pull versus  push factors  in total capital  flows  emphasizing  the role  of US short
term interest rates.  Griffin, Nardari  and Stulz  (2001)  analyze pull versus push factors in portfolio equity
flows.  The definitions of pull and push  factors  are usually tied to the geographic  location  of  the factors.
This is not the case  in our analysis so we choose not  to use the same concepts for  darity.
3both the time series and cross sectional dimension of the data.  We re-estimate the invest-
ment model over moving windows of 16 years of data and use the re-estimated  model to
compute the globalization  measure.  This  approach accommodates  the difficult  problem
of identifying  structural  breaks, and possibly  multiple breaks,  in a large  cross section of
countries and with many variables.7
Consistent  with the  hypothesis  of increased  world  capital  market  integration,  the
analysis  reveals that global factors  have increased  in importance  in explaining  the dy-
namics of the cross section of foreign direct investment and the level of aggregate  foreign
investment  over  time for  developing  and developed  countries.  For  the full sample  of
countries  in  1999,  the globalization  measure  was 62 percent,  which represents  an  8 fold
increase  since  1985.  Furthermore,  developing  countries'  exposure  to global factors has
increased  faster than  that of developed  countries  and the gap is narrower  at the end of
the 1990s,  particularly  so for  Latin America.  Interestingly,  we find a significant  decline
in global factors  as drivers of direct investment around the time of the debt crisis  of the
1980s  for developing  and developed countries  alike, but no noticeable change due to the
recent Mexican,  Russian, or East Asian crises.  Finally, using the liberalization variables
in  Bekaert,  Harvey  and  Lundblad  (2002),  we  show  that  our  globalization  measure  is
explained to a significant extent  by the level offi nancial  liberalization.
The  increased  exposure  to  global  factors  that  we  find  is  associated with  increased
flows of direct investment  into emerging market economies.  While these findings consti-
tute evidence  of greater  worldwide market integration,  we also find that growth in local
productivity,  trade  openness,  financial  depth,  low  government  burden,  and  macroeco-
nomic stability are important domestic  drivers.
The sequence oft he paper  is as follows.  Section  2 briefly presents  severalt heories of
foreign direct  investment.  This section appeals to appendix A for three case studies (En-
ron International,  Intel International,  and Johnson  and Johnson) intended  at providing
explicit examples of global factors at work as drivers of foreign  direct  investment and to
'See  for example  Bekaert  and Harvey  (1995),  and Bekaert,  Harvey and Lumsdaine  (2002)  for alter-
native approaches.
4appendix  B  for a simple empirical  model of foreign  investment.  Section  3 presents the
results  from our analysis.  Finally,  section  4 concludes  with a discussion of the public
policy implications of our findings.
2  Modeling  Foreign Direct Investment
We discuss several  theories  of foreign  direct  investment placing  particular  emphasis  on
recent work on capital market issues.  These theories will be  subsequently embedded in
an empirical  framework.8
A.  Taxes,  Wage Rates, and Tariffs
Countries that want to attract a foreign direct investor usually have to compete with
other  oountries,  which  represent  feasible  alternatives  to the investor, by  offering  gener-
ous benefit  packages  (usually  this includes the country of origin of the multinational).
These packages  include,  among other things, tax holidays, guarantees  of a stable labor
market generally  with low or fixed nominal wage rates, and the provision of high quality
transportation or conmunications  infrastructures.
A multinational company might also be interested in producing  in a country because
of the location ofi ts product  market.  For example, high domestic import tariffs make it
too costly for the multinational to export its products from a foreign country.  Alterna-
tively,  the multinational  can produce domestically  for the local market (see,  for example
Kindleberger  1966 and Horst  1973).
B.  E&propriation Risk and Inalienable Assets
8The reader is referred to Caves  (1996)  for a comprehensive  review of theories and empirical tests on
direct investment.  Outside of the scope of our  empirical  modeling  is the role of asymmetric information
in promoting foreign  direct investment  (e.g.  Razin,  Sadka,  and Yuen  1999  and Tesar and  Hull  2000).
Another issue not pursued here  is the use of transfer pricing by multinationals to reduce income  taxation
at the parent  level  (e.g.  Casson  1979).  Moreover,  due to their use  of different  financial  instruments  in
funding investments  (i.e., debt and equity at home and abroad), multinationals might be better equipped
to do tax arbitrage across countries and assets  (e.g.  Hodder  and Senbet  1990, and Mills and Newberry
2002).
5Participation  in international capital markets has obvious risks to investors, most no-
tably the risk ofd irect or indirect  expropriation.9 Countries not only expropriate foreign
direct  investors, but also international debt creditors and portfolio equity investors.  The
risk  of expropriation  naturally  gives  rise to  financing  constraints  because  international
investors  perceive  the increase  in the likelihood  of expropriation  as more capital  is fun-
neled  in.  Importantly,  foreign  direct  investment  is harder  to expropriate,  because  it is
usually  attached  to intangible  assets  which  are themselves  hard to expropriate  (Eaton
and Gersovitz  1984 and Albuquerque  2002).10  In Albuquerque (2002),  this  leads to a de-
fault  premium that  is  smaller  for foreign  direct  investment,  to relatively  greater  inflows
of foreign  direct  investment and  to direct investment  being less volatile than other flows.
C.  Wealth Effects
Changes  in the  real  exchange  rate  affect  the  relative  wealth  levels  of foreign  and
domestic investors and may further lead to changes in investors' actual relative purchasing
power.  Froot and  Stein  (1991)  showed  that  in  order  for  changes  in exchange  rates  to
change the  relative  purchasing  power of domestic and foreign  investors,  these investors
must  be  subject  to binding  financing  constraints.  If not,  additional  money  could  be
borrowed  that  re-establishes  their original  purchasing  power.  In  their  setting,  a  real
appreciation  of the foreign  currency  increases  the purchasing  power  of foreign investors
and  leads to more  direct investment.
2.1  An Econometric  Model of Foreign Direct Investment
The  upshot  of the preceding discussion  and of the simple model  developed  in  appendix
B  is the following  equation for aggregate  optimal  foreign  direct  investment  flows  into a
9Examples of indirect expropriation  include the levying of high unexpected  profit taxes, the imposition
of restrictions  on capital  outflows, or the real devaluation  of the local  currency.
'°Examples  of intangible assets  include  blue prints, managerial  skills,  and marketing networks.
6country:
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In this equation It is the level of direct investment inflows, At is the domestic productivity
level,  wt  is  the wage  rate,  Rt  is the  domestic  cost  of capital,  1 - Pt is the probability
of expropriation  of foreign  investors,  /3t  is the stochastic  discount  rate used  by  foreign
investors to discount future flows,"' and xt is the real exchange rate measured in units of
foreign currency per unit of domestic currency.  The remaining terms reflect the possibility
that the drivers of direct investment display autoregressive  conditional heteroskedasticity.
According to the model in appendix B and the theory discussion above, the coefficient
cl > 0,  and c2  - c5 are all predicted  to be positive if the corresponding variables  display
positive persistence.  According  to Froot and  Stein  (1991)  c6<  0.  As in  their setting,
this  is  also the case here  if the  future  value of the  real  exchange rate is independent  of
today's  value.  However,  if the  rate of change of the real exchange  rate displays positive
persistence,  a high  value of the domestic  currency  today  signals  an even  higher  value
tomorrow and high future profits measured in foreign currency units.  In this case c6 > 0.
Therefore,  the sign on the change in the real exchange  rate is theoretically  ambiguous.
Inspection of (1)  clarifies what are the local and global factors  driving foreign direct
investment.  Local  factors  are  captured  by the percentage  change  in the real  exchange
rate,  the  domestic  productivity  shocks,  and the  domestic  real  interest  rate  and  wage
rate.  In the estimations  below we  allow  for a  larger  set  of local  factors.  Importantly,
these local variables  are driven by (or represent)  local factors only to the extent that they
are orthogonal  to the global factors.  In fact,  in a general  equilibrium complete markets
model without  capital market frictions the real exchange  rate,  the wage rate,  and other
local  variables  are  only functions of the  global  factors  (or state variables).  But, to the
extent  that the world is partially segmented  these  local variables will contain important
"In  the  Consumption-CAPM  model  the  stochastic  discount  factor  equals  the marginal rate  of  in-
tertemporal substitution.
7localc omponents as  well.'2 For example, country productivity  shocks are known to have
significant  global components  (e.g.  Glick  and Rogoff  1995, and Iscan  2000).  Thus, we
may  write
InAt =  aoInA G +  al  lnA  A,
where  AG  and  AL  stand for  the global  and  local components  of domestic  productivity
respectively.  Below  we use these ideas  in constructing our globalization measure  which
captures the size of the global  exposure  in foreign direct  investment.
Importantly,  the stochastic discount  rate used by foreign investors to discount  cash
flows from local subsidiaries (,3 t) is driven by global factors.  In general, the discount factor
varies with state variables or factors that impact the foreign investor's intertemporal rate
of substitution.  Some of these factors might also be local sources of uncertainty if markets
are incomplete.  If this country risk cannot be diversified  away we may write
ln  t=Ao lnSG +  Al,ln  . (2)
What global factors capture the variation in discount  rates?T  his question  is a difficult
one to answer  as it  presumes  that  we have  a fully specified  general  equilibrium  model
to identify  these  factors.  Often researchers  have  chosen  to view  the  global  factors  as
unobservable  (e.g.  Harvey  1991,  and Campbell  and Hamao  1992).  This is also our first
route.1 3 We estimate latent, or unobserved,  factors from a set ofg lobal  variables Zt:' 4
In,3tG = b'ZG.  (3)
The  number  of rows in matrix b indicates  the number of relevant  global factors acting
through  the  discount  factor.  Under  the assumption  of a  representative  international
investor,  estimation of (1)-(3)  across  many  countries yields  a system  of equations  with
1 2This is  a  natural  assumption,  because  foreign direct  investment  is  to some  extent  an  outcome of
transactions  costs and capital market  imperfections  (see for example  Caves  1996).
13The same  identification  issues  apply to local  factors, but because there is no good way of imposing
restrictions  on  these we assume  they are observed.
'4In  picking these global variables  we constrain ourselves to use the instruments that have been shown
to explain the cross  section  of international  equity returns.
8cross equation  restrictions  coming  from  b.  One way  to impose these restrictions is to
first estimate the global factor using principal  components and then use it in the system
of equations  described by (1)-(3).
The empirical  section that follows also presents results  from  a model  which is esti-
mated under the assumption that we,  as econometricians,  observe  the global factors.  In
this approach  we  use the  same global  variables  that were used  in the principal  compo-
nents analysis  as the de facto global factors.  In the robustness  section  we estimate  the
latent  global factor with GMM by imposing the cross equation restrictions directly in the
estimation of the investment equation  (1).
3  Empirical  Analysis
In this section,  we implement and estimate the model described in equations  (1)-(3) us-
ing cross-country and  time-series  data.  Through this country-level  exercise  we examine
the significance  of various theories on the determinants  of foreign direct  investment  dis-
cussed above.  Furthermore,  we  use the estimated  model and the globalization  measure
to ascertain the relative importance of local and global factors in explaining the variation
of foreign direct  investment.  By examining the time series behavior  of the globalization
measure  and how it differs across industrial and developing  countries, we derive conclu-
sions on  how the process  of market integration  is affecting the behavior  of foreign  direct
investment.
This section  is organized  around  the major  empirical  objectives  and corresponding
exercises outlined above.  First, we present the variables  included in our empirical model
of foreign  direct  investment  and  provide  their  basic descriptive  statistics.  Second,  we
discuss the results of foreign direct investment regressions for various country samples and
different  restrictions  on country-specific  parameters.  And third,  we report  and  discuss
the variance decomposition  results and the globalization  measure.
93.1  Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical specifications that we present below relate foreign direct investment inflows,
measured  as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), to global and local factors.15
To characterize  the global  factors  we use  a set of  global  variables  ZG that summarize
the array  of returns  faced  by  international  investors.  These  variables  have been  used
to explain  the  cross  section of both international  and US  expected  equity returns  (e.g.
Campbell  and  Hamao  1992)  and  include  the US  T-bill rate,  an  index  of total  return
in world  stock  markets,  the slope  of the  US yield  curve,  the US  credit spread  and  the
rate of growth ofw orld per capita  GDP,  which provides  a proxy  for global  productivity
growth.  To transform the nominal returns in the T-bill rate and the stock rnarket index
into real returns we include the US inflation rate among the global variables as a measure
of inflation  expectations.  However,  because realized  inflation provides  a noisy measure
of anticipated inflation,  in the regressions we  do not restrict  it to enter subtracting from
the nominal  rates of return.
As suggested above,  we work both with the entire list of global factors,  which assumes
that these are observable,  and with a synthetic measure of these variables,  which assumes
that the global factors are unobservable,  constructed using a principal components proce-
dure.  We build the synthetic measure  as a weighted  sum oft he principal components  of
the set of global variables,  with the weights  given by the fraction of the overall variance
explained  by each  of the  components.  We  call  the resulting  variable  synthetic  global
factor. 16
Our selection of variables used to describe the local factors reflects the variety of views
on the determinants of foreign direct investment outlined in the previous sections.  In our
basic specifications  we include a totalo fn ine local variables in Z7.  These are:  per capita
GDP growth, as a measure of domestic productivity growth;o verall tax pressure, proxied
'5Appendix  C contains  a detailed description  of our data and its sources.
" 6We  apologize  for the  abuse  in  notation.  In terms  of our  notation  in section  2t  he  first  approach
assumes  b  is the  identity  matrix,  whereas  the second  approach  assumes  that  b  is composed  by  the
weights described  in the text.
10by public consumption relative to GDP, which we would expect to have a negative impact
on foreign direct investment;  financial depth, measured by the ratio of credit to the private
sector as a percentage of GDP, to assess the role of the domestic credit sector in attracting
foreign direct investment;  the rate of change of the real exchange  rate, to capture possible
wealth effects; institutionalq uality, proxied by the FReedom  House Civil Liberties index,
as a measure  of the strength  of property  rights  and the  absence  of  corruption,  which
should have a positive effect on foreign direct investment if it is related to the probability
of  not  expropriating  foreign  investors;  trade  openness,  reflecting  the  recent  literature
on the complementarity  of trade  and  foreign direct  investment  (specifically,  we  use  the
residuals  from a regression of the ratio  of total trade to GDP on the log of population,
country area, and an oil exporters dummy);  and, finally, three variables  which attempt to
measure uncertainty  through the volatilities  of the growth rates of real per capita GDP,
the real exchange rate, and the terms of trade, all of which should be expected to affect
foreign  direct  investment  negatively  (recall  that these  uncertainty-related  variables  are
implied by our model in appendix B if there is conditional heteroskedasticity).  Below we
also allow for other variables  such as the domestic wage rate  for which we  have limited
data.
The sample of countries used in our analysis is dictated by data availability  only. We
include in our data set every  country possessing  at least three observations  for each of
the variables listed  above  within the period  ranging  from  1970  to 1999.  This yields  94
countries with a combined  total of over  1,900 observations.  Of these, close to one-fourth
correspond  to  20  industrial  countries,  while  the rest  correspond  to  the  74 developing
countries in the sample.
Table  1 presents descriptive statistics  for the overall sample.  As the table suggests,
the data set  contains  a few negative  numbers  for the ratio of foreign direct  investment
to  GDP  which  correspond  to episodes  of disinvestment.  The  largest  negative  values
for foreign  direct  investment belong  to Panama  in  1987-88.  There  are  also  some large
positive values reflecting  foreign direct investment into small economies,  with the largest
11one  corresponding to Equatorial  Guinea,
3.2  Regression  Results
To implement (1) we introduce a random error and country-specific effects.  The country-
specific  effects  are needed  due  to the diverse  set  of countries  in our sample.  We  also
perform our  regressions  using the share of foreign direct  investment on domestic  GDP
rather than the logarithm of foreign investment  to control for size.  As discussed  above,
we present estimates for two models.  In the first model we restrict  the coefficients  on all
global  and local variables  to be the same  across all countries.  Letting Ztj  =  [Zt  Z]',
the corresponding  regression  equation is
= '0 +  6j + 77Ztj  + utj,  (Model 1) GDPt,
where the indices t and j  represent  time and country, respectively.
In  the second  model,  we  allow both country-specific  intercepts  and country-specific
slope coefficients on the global factor, but restrict the  coefficients. on local variables to be
the same for all countries.  In this case, the regression equation becomes,
G^it = 'o + 6j +  7jZ? + nL'ZL  +  utj.  (Model 2)
Given that the values of global variables are the same for all countries at a given point
in time, the first model may understate the importance of global factors in explaining the
variance of foreign direct investment by restricting the variability of the global component
across countries.  The second model allows for heterogeneous responses to the same global
conditions,  which  increases  their predictive  power  on foreign  direct  investment  at  the
potential cost of reduced estimation efficiency.
3.2.1  Model  1:  Homogeneous  Slope  Coefficients
The  results  from  estimating  Model  1 are  presented  in Thbles  2  and  3.  In the  first  of
these we include each of the six global variables  independently  in the regression.  In the
12latter one,  we replace the global variables by the synthetic global factor,  discussed above.
We work with three samples of countries -all, industrial,  and developing  countries- and
report their  results in each column of both tables.
First, consider the case when  the global  variables are included  independently  in the
regression  (Table 2).  For the sample of all countries the overall fit of the regression  (R2 =
0.45) is substantial  given the large number of observations  (over 1,900).  Not surprisingly,
much of that is due. to the country-specific effects.  In fact, the within-country  R2, which
measures the ability of the model to explain the changes in the dependent variable within
a given  country,  is  0.13.  There  are  interesting  differences  between the  industrial  and
developing  country  samples  regarding the fit of the regression.  The overall  R2 is about
20  percent  larger  for  developingt  han  for  industrial  countries.  However,  the  within-
country  R2 for  industrial  countries  is  more than  twice as large  as  that  for  developing
countries.  Therefore,  relative to industrial countries,  the level of foreign direct investment
in developing countries appears to vary more across countries, and their changes in foreign
direct  investment are less predictable.
Let us consider the results on the global variables.  For the three samples under consid-
eration, the results are similar.1 7 Both the T-Bill rate and the slope of the US yield curve
always have  negative  and  significant coefficients.  The growth  rate  of world  per  capita
GDP is  negative  in  all samples  and significantly  so,  except  in the sample  of industrial
countries.  (Its lack of significance  in the  developed-country  sample  may be due to the
fact that, given their large size, developed countries'  own growth rate is heavily correlated
with the world rate  of growth, thus confusing  global  and local factors.)  An increase  in
these three variables denotes an improvement  in the performance  of international  assets.
The fact  that both  the T-bill  rate  and the slope  of the US  yield  curve carry  negative
and significant  coefficients indicates that FDI flows respond to both short- and long-term
global investment returns (and not just short-term US interest rates as Calvo et al., 1993,
found for total private capital  flows or as Bekaert, Harvey and Lumsdaine 2002 found for
'7The U.S.  inflation rate is only  used  as a control  variable,  and we do not discuss its related results.
13US portfolio equity flows).  The US credit spread does not carry a statistically  significant
coefficient,  which  may  be explained  by considering  that  an improvement  in the return
of high-yield  assets  is  likely to  be accompanied  by  a correspondingly  large  increase  in
their  risk.  In  net,  therefore,  an increase  in the return  of high-yield  global  assets  does
not  distract  FDI flowing  to local  markets.  A  similar  explanation applies  to the lack of
significance of the index of world stock market returns:  an increase in the index not only
denotes an increase  in returns  but may also signal an increase  in the associated  risk.  At
any rate, the last two results are surprising in light of the evidence in Griffin et al.  (2001)
for US  portfolio  equity flows who find a significant impact of US returns as push  factor
for US equity  flows.
Turning to the local variables,  the results for the three samples are similar with a few
interesting  discrepancies.  In the three samples  of countries, the growth rate ofG DP per
capita and  the  measure  of trade  openness  present  positive  and  significant  coefficients,
while  the  size of government  consumption  carries a negative  and significant  coefficient.
The size  of these effects  appears  to be stronger  in industrial  than  developing  countries.
Improvements in overall  productivity  (as reflected in higher  economic growth) and larger
trade  openness  serve  to attract foreign  direct  investment  into the country.  Conversely,
a worsening  in the  burden  of government  (through  higher  taxation,  for  instance)  acts
as  a deterrent  for foreign  direct  investment  flows  into  the  country.  These  findings  are
largely  consistent with other studies  (e.g.  Singh and Jun  1995 and  Fernandez-Arias  and
Hausmann 2000).  In turn, the measure of financial depth carries a positive and significant
coefficient  in the full  and  developing  country samples,  but is not significantly  different
from zero  in the industrial  country  regression.  This suggests that  improving  financial
development  from poor levels does encourage  foreign  direct  investment into the country,
but this effect disappears  as financial markets  get  highly developed.
In  the  samples  of all  and  developing  countries,  the volatility  of per capita output
growth  presents  a negative and significant  coefficient,  implying that  macroeconomic  in-
stability drives  away  foreign  direct  investment.  The other measures  of volatility  (of the
14real  exchange  rate  and  the terms  of trade)  do not have a significant  effect  on  foreign
direct  investment  inflows  in  any  of the samples.  It is likely  that their effect  is already
captured  by volatility  of economic  growth.
The  rate of real  exchange  rate depreciation  is likewise  insignificant  in  all  three  re-
gressions.  This  contrasts  with  the evidence  in  Goldberg  and  Klein  (1998)  (who  find
that foreign direct  investment  by both Japan  and  the United  States to the East  Asian
countries  in their  sample is significantly  affected  by  bilateral  real  exchange  rates)  and
questions the hypothesis in Froot  and Stein  (1991).  Finally, we find no evidence that the
quality  of governance,  as  reflected  in the  civil liberties  index,  has  an impact  on  foreign
direct investment  inflows  in any  sample.
Table  3  shows the results  obtained when  the global  variables  are  replaced  with the
global  factor.  We  conduct  this exercise  in order  to facilitate  the comparison with the
results on the heterogeneous  model below.  As explained above, the synthetic global fac-
tor is constructed  as a weighted  average  of the  principal  components  of the six global
variables.  In the calculation of the global factor,  all six original variables enter with posi-
tive weights.  Since the significant global variables carry negative coefficients  in the basic
regression  (see  Table  2),  it  is not surprising  that the  'global'  principal component  also
presents  a negative  and significant  coefficient  (except  in the industrial country sample).
As it  is measured  here, a decline in the synthetic  global  factor represents less attractive
conditions for  investment in international  markets.  The regression results confirm that
this acts  as a push force for  foreign direct investment to flow into local markets.
It is interesting  to note  that the size of the  coefficient  on the global  factor  is three
times as big in developing than in industrial countries, and only significant for developing
countries.  This is to be expected given that international  market  conditions  as proxied
by  the global  factor  are to  a large  extent determined  by local  conditions  in the richer
economies  and,  particularly,  the  US.  In  addition,  these  are  also  the most  integrated
economies.
Judging from the regression fit, the global factor appears to be a good summary  mea-
15sure.  In fact the R2o btained  with the synthetic global factor is almost the same as that
found using the 6 global variables independently.  Moreover, the estimated coefficients  on
the local variables obtained with the more parsimonious model are quite similar in terms
of sign, size, and significance.
3.2.2  Model  2:  Heterogeneous  Global Factor Coefficients
So far we have imposed the restriction that the global factors have the same effect in all
countries.  We now relax this constraint  and re-estimate  the model allowing  for different
effects across countries.  Here we limit ourselves to the synthetic global factor given by the
principal components procedure.  As an extension, we will consider below joint estimation
of the parameters  of the direct  investment  equation  and the  latent  global  factor while
allowing the impact of the latter to vary across countries.
The results using the synthetic global factor are shown in Table 4.  The first column
reports  the  full-sample  results.  Comparingt  he  estimates  with those  obtained  under
parameter  homogeneity,  it can be seen that  among the local variables  the rate of GDP
growth and its volatility,  as well as the trade openness variable, remain highly significant.
The  coefficient  on government  consumption  declines  somewhat  but  remains  significant
at the  10 percent level,  while that  on financial  depth loses  all significance.  In contrast,
the volatility of the terms of trade now  carries a significant  negative  coefficient.
The  table  alsor  eports  the  mean  of  the  country-specific  coefficients  on the global
factor.  For the  overall sample  it equals -0.0069,  not very  different  from the coefficient
obtained  from  the restricted  regression  (-0.0053),  and strongly  significant.  However,
the individual-country  estimates  (not reported)  are fairly disperse.  Of the 94 individual
estimates,  56 are negative  (of which  16 significant at the 5 percent level) and 38 positive
(3 significant).
Columns  2  and  3  in Table  4r  eport  the  estimates  obtained  in  the industrial  and
developing country subsamples.  For industrial countries the results are again fairly similar
to those obtained from the restricted specification.  The main difference is that the credit
16variable  now  is  marginally significant,  while the  volatility of the terms of trade is not.
The average across countries of the impact of the global factor equals -0.0018, very close
to the  restricted  estimate of  -0.0015.  The  individual  estimates  vary  substantially  in
magnitude  and significance.  Out  of 20,  12  are negative  and  8  positive.  However,  only
one  of the former is  significant at the 5 percent level.
In  the  case of developing  countries  (column  3),  the  main difference  relative to the
restricted  specification  regardingt  he  local  variables  is that  both  financial  depth  and
government  consumption are now insignificant,  while the volatility  of the terms of trade
becomes  marginally  significant.  The  mean  of the  country-specific  coefficients  on  the
global  effect  equals  -0.0078,  not too  different  from the restricted  estimate  (-0.0061)
obtained  earlier.  Of the individual  estimates,  44  are negative  (of which  15  significant)
and  30 positive  (of which  3  are  significant).  Figure  1 shows the  distributions  of the
individual  estimates on the global factor  for developed  and  developing  countries.  Both
are  concentrated  around  -0.01,  but the  distribution of  developing  countries  is  more
disperse,  with two large values at the right end of the distribution.
3.3  A Globalization  Measure
The regressions reported above confirm that foreign direct investment  is  affected by both
local and global factors.  However,  we are interested  in assessing  the relative importance
of the  twoi  n  the  determination  of  foreign  direct  investment  flows.  Furthermore,  we
want  to  know  if their  contributions  have  changed  over  time,  and  whether  they  differ
systematically  across different  groups of countries.
How much of the explanatory power of our empirical specifications is respectively due
to local and global factors?  The answer involves a basic identification  problem,  given that
both sets  off actors are not mutually orthogonal.  Assuming  that each country  is small
relative to the world economy,  it is reasonable to infer that global factors are exogenous
with respect  to local  factors.  In other  words,  there  is  no feedback  from  local factors
to global  factors.  This  identifying  assumption  allows  a decomposition  of the  explained
17variance  of the  dependent  variable  into  twop  arts:  one part  explained  by  the  global
factors, either directly or through their impact  on local factors,  and another explained  by
that component  of the  local variables which  is orthogonal  to the global  variables.  Note
that only the latter component  is truly local( i.e.,  not affected  by global  variables).
More formally, to obtain the variation of foreign direct investment explained by global
factors,  we first  regress the  local  variables on the global  factors  and  take the residuals
from that  regression  as the 'true' local factors.  Construct
Cov (77'ZG, f7LZL)
/3  -Var  (i7'ZG)
The contribution oft he global  factor to explained variation in direct investment  is
(1  + 3)2 Var (I),ZG)
Var (7)'zG +  f7D ZL)
which  we  call  globalization  measure.  By  construction  the  globalization  measure  lies
between  0 and  1 with  1 indicating  full  globalization  with no  role for  local  factors.  In
computing  the globalization  measure  we exclude  from the denominator  country-specific
fixed  effects.  Strictly  speaking  they  do not  represent  an  'explanation'  of the observed
variation in foreign direct investment,  but rather a measure  of our ignorance concerning
time-invariant  country-specific  ingredients.  Thus, the decompositions  below  refer to the
'within' variation of the data, i.e.,  after removing the fixed effects.
Toa nalyze  how  the  roles  of local  and  global  factors  have  changed  over  time,  we
perform  repeatedly  the above  decomposition  by  re-estimating  Model  1,  as specified  in
Table  2,  over  a changing  time  sample.  Specifically,  we  use  a moving  16-year  window
to define  the relevant  sample  for  each  re-estimation. 18 In  each  estimation,  we  use the
sample of all countries available in the corresponding  time window.  Using the estimated
parameters,  we compute the shares  of explained  variance by  global and local factors  for
"8Note  that the  country  sample  may  change  slightly  across  re-estimations  due  to the fact  that the
panel  is  unbalanced.  For  this reason,  we experimented  also with  other alternatiye  procedures,  such as
windows of growing size,  i.e.,  adding years,  but not dropping  them,  for  each  re-estimation.  The results
were  qualitatively  similar.  We  find  the approach  in  the text preferable  since  it  accounts for  potential
sample  breaks  (see  Bekaert  and Harvey  (1995)  for another  approach).
18the samples  of all,  industrial,  and  developing  countries.19 Table  5  and  Figure  2 report
the globalization  measure.
There  are  two very  clear  results.  The  first  is that the share  of variance  explained
by  global  factors  or  globalization  measure  has  increased  notably  in the last  15  years,
from less than 10  percent  to over  60  percent.  Furthermore,  the increase  is statistically
significant,  as  implied by  the 95 percent  confidence  bands shown in Figure  2a,  derived
from a bootstrapping  procedure.
The second  result is that the globalization measure  has been larger for industrial than
for developing  countries  (Figure 2b).  This is natural given that the former  are  arguably
more integrated  economies.  However,  this difference  has shrank over  the years:  fifteen
years  ago  the  share  of global  factors  was  twice  as  large  in  industrial  than  developing
countries, but by the end oft he 1990's  the gap was reduced to  30 percent.  Indeed,  the
same bootstrapping  procedure used above shows that in the period 1989-93 the estimates
of the contribution  of the globalf actor  for industrial countries lie outside the 95 percent
confidence  bands (not  shown to avoid cluttering  the graph)  constructed for  developing
countries,  suggesting that the difference between the two sets  of countries regarding the
role of global forces was significant.  After  1994,  this ceases to be the case.
Where  does the increased importance  of the global  factors come from?  Is  it due to
the direct impact or its indirect  impact  via the correlation  with the local factors?  This
is an important question not only because one would like to check that our identification
procedure  is  not  eluding  the  contribution  of  global  factors,  but  also  because  for  the
reasons argued above,  according to which we expect  foreign direct investment to be more
exposed  to global factors,  we should also expect local variables to also be more exposed
to them.
We have decomposed  the explained variance by the global factor into the component
coming directly from the global factor (i.e., Var (i7'ZG))  and that coming from the impact
1
9That  is,  for  a  given  estimation  window,  we  allow  the  data  but  not  the  estimated  parameters  to
vary  across the  three  samples,  i.e.,  all,  industrial, and  developing  countries.  For all samples,  we  use  the
estimated parameters  corresponding  to the sample of all countries.  This allows us to focus on the effects
of different  data on explanatory variables across  samples.
19of the global  factor  on the local variables  (i.e.,  /3var  (i,'ZG)).  For the full sample both
sources  of variation show a similar  pattern,  with  the indirect  role  of the global  factor
increasing from  2 percent  to  11 percent of the explained  variance.  Thus  we argue that
the direct impact of the global factor is more important,  but also that the indirect impact
grows  as expected.
It is important to note that the ability of the model to explain  foreign direct invest-
ment inflows (R2) has increased,  though modestly,  over the last  15 years.  This is shown
in  Table  5  and  also  in  Figure  3.  More remarkable  is the  rise  in  the within-R2,  from
about  6 percent to over  16 percent,  revealing  an improved performance  oft he model to
explain the changes in foreign direct investment inflows  over time.  Throughout  the  last
15  years the ratio of within-  to total-R2 grew  gradually  from about  one-sixth  to close
to one-third,  implying that  our explanatory  variables gained predictive power on foreign
direct  investment inflows relative to the (unobserved)  country-specific  effects.  This com-
plements  the evidence  in favor of the increasing  role of global  factors to explain foreign
direct  investment inflows.
Is the  impact  of global  factors  different  across regions of the developing  world?  On
the one hand many countries around the world and across Latin America and East Asia
have  liberalized  their  capital  markets  through  the last  20  years.  On the  other  hand,
policy  effectiveness  and  commitment  may  have  differed  substantially  across  countries
and  in systematic ways, perhaps due to cultural issues or social rigidities.  Figure 4 plots
our  globalization  measure  across  regions  of the developing  world:  Latin America  and
Asia.  It is apparent  from the picture that in recent years Latin America  has seen greater
exposure  to global factors than  Asia,  a difference  of nearly  20 percentage  points.  One
possible reading  oft his is that the integration process  of countries in this region has been
more successful.
203.4  Global Factors and the Level of Foreign Direct Investment
The analysis  of the globalization  measure  reveals  an increased  exposure  of direct  in-
vestment  to global  factors.  However,  it  is  not informative  about  how integration  has
contributed to the increased  level  of flows of direct investment.  This effect is shown in
Figure  5.  The  figure  plots the  ratio  of foreign  direct  investment  to  GDP,  relative  to
the mean  level  of direct  investment,  that would result if it  had  been  driven solely  by
the global  factor.  To construct  the figure  we use  the estimates  from Model  1 with the
synthetic factor and count as the global factor only  its direct impact  (i.e., we exclude the
impact oft he global factor on the local variables).
While foreign direct investment  was fairly stable as impacted  by global  factors until
late  1970s,  it  declined  substantially  in the  early  1980's.  This is  consistent  with the
drying up of international  capital  flows  subsequent to the Latin America debt  crisis,  as
suggested  by  models  of sovereign  default  (e.g.  Eaton and Gersovitz  1981).  It is  also
the period of great inflows towards the US economy.  The post-1982  period is associated
with increased  integration ofc apital markets  (particular so in the 1990's) and our results
show a substantial role  of the global factor:  foreign direct investment  as a share of GDP
increased from roughly 0.009 below average in 1982 to 0.004 above average in 1999.  These
numbers are roughly consistent with thcse in footnote 5 in the Introduction  to this paper
that suggested that foreign direct investment as percentage of world GDP increased by 1
percentage  point  from the 1980s to the 1990s.  It should be noted that the results  would
be even  stronger had we included  the indirect  effect  of the  global factor acting through
the local variables.
3.5  Global Factors and Liberalization
In this subsection  we correlate our globalization  measure with measures  of financial  lib-
eralization.  We use the liberalization  measures in Bekaert,  Harvey  and Lundblad (2002),
official  liberalization,  first sign  and investability  plus a measure  ofb alance-of-payments
restrictions.  Official  liberalization  is  a dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  of one  if
21the equity market  is liberalized  based on the chronology in Bekaert  and Harvey  (2000).
First  sign  is a broader  measure  that takes the  value of one  if there is either an official
liberalization  or ADR and country fund introduction.2 0 Investability  is the ratio of cap-
italization of the IFC  'investable"  to the  "global"  stocks in a country  as in Edison and
Warnock (2001).  For balance-of-payments  restrictions  we consider 4 types of restrictions
recorded by  the International  Monetary  Fund.  They are (i)  restrictions on payments  for
capital transactions,  (ii)  restrictions on repatriation off oreign investment  earnings,  (iii)
presence of multiple exchange rates, and (iv) restrictions on current account transactions.
For each of these  categories,  the IMF  records a score  of 1 when restrictions  apply, and 0
otherwise.  Our proxy is the sum of these scores for a given  country and year.
Each of these liberalization variables  is country specific  while our globalization  mea-
sure applies  for groups  of countries.  To come up with a proxy  for the extent  of liberal-
ization in a particular group of countries we compute the weighted  average liberalization
level for each variable where the weights are the countries' gross domestic product divided
by the sum  of outputs  across  all  countries.
In  table  6  we  report  the  results  of regressing  the  globalization  measure  on  the  4
different  indices  of liberalization.  As expected,  the signs of the coefficients  are poesitive
for the first three measures and negative  for balance of payments restrictions (a high value
for balance of payments  restrictions  indicates  low liberalization).  Most coefficients  are
significant at the 1 percent  significance  level and the R-squares  from the regressions are
very high (ranging from .5 to .7  for developing countries and are about .16 for industrial
countries except when using capital restrictions where the R-square is .6) indicating that
a substantial portion of the time series variation of our globalization measure is accounted
for by the rise of world market integration.  Interestingly, the increased  relevance of global
factors  is much more  related  to increased  liberalization* in developing  countries than in
industrialc ountries.
We  view the results  presented  in  table  6  as  evidence  that  increased  financial  and
20For  developed countries  first sign turns out  to be identical to official  liberalization.
22capital market integration worldwide has contributed to an increased role of global factors
in driving direct  investment.
3.6  Extensions
In this section  we  do a roll  of extensions  and  robustness  checks  to our analysis.  Our
motivation  to have this  separate  analysis  has  to do with the lack  of high-quality  and
broad-coverage  data on variables  representing  other  explanations  for foreign direct  in-
vestment inflows.  We consider,  in turn, the relationship of foreign direct investment with
the  level  of local wages,  local stock-market  activity,  the degree  of balance-of-payments
restrictions,  and the occurrence of privatizations.  Across all of these alternative  specifi-
cations we systematically found that our previous  results on the role of the global factors
are not  qualitatively  affected.2'
The  results  are  presented  in  Table  7,  where  each  column is  devoted  to a different
additional explanatory variable.  In the first extension, we consider the level of local wage
rates  as an additional determinant  of foreign direct  investment  inflows.  This variable  is
measured as  average  annual wages  and salaries  in the manufacturing  sector,  expressed
in  constant  US dollars.  The number  of observations  is reduced  by  close  to 40  percent
with respect  to the basic  regression.  However,  the main  results  are  preserved  in the
new regression.  The wage variable  enters the  regression  with a negative and significant
coefficient,  indicating that  local labor costs  do influence  foreigners'  decision to invest  in
the country.
Next,  we consider  local  stock-market  activity,  proxied  by the  ratio of stock market
traded  value to  GDP. It carries a positive and significant  coefficient,  which implies that
local stock-market  activity  and  foreign  direct  investment  inflows are  positively  related.
However,  given that  foreign  direct investment is likely to involve transactions on stock-
market listed companies,  it is difficult to establish the direction of causality between the
two  variables.  Note that when  we  include  this variable  in the regression,  the sample
2tResults are  available upon  request.
23size  is reduced  to less than  half.  When stock-market  activity is included in the regres-
sion,  private  credit -the proxy for  financial depth used  in  the basic regression-  loses  its
significance  (and positive  sign).
Column  3  presents  the  results  when  the  occurrence  of privatizations  is considered
as  an  additional  local  variable.  This  is a dummy  variable  that  takes the  value  of  1 in
a given country/year  observation  when  there  are  positive  revenues  from  privatization
transactions  in the corresponding  country  and  year.  The main  drawback  of the data
set  for  this  variable  is  that  it starts  in  1988.  We  assume  that prior  to this  year  the
privatization  dummy  takes  the  value  of zero.  This  is incorrect  in a handful  of cases
(notably  the United  Kingdom  and Chile) but we  believe is accurate  in the majority of
cases given that the strong drive for privatization  across the world started in the 1990's.
As expected, the occurrence of privatization  carries a positive and significant  coefficient,
which attests to the  importance  of foreign  participation  in the privatization  processes,
particularly  of developing countries.  It seems that privatization  acted as a catalyst that
allowed local factors to exert  a stronger pull over foreign  direct investment  flows.
Next,  in column  4 we add a qualitative measure  of balance-of-payments  restrictions
mentioned  in the previous  subsection.  The inclusion  of this variable reduces the sample
size only slightly,  and  most results from the basic regression  are  preserved.  As expected,
this variable  carries a negative  (and significant)  coefficient,  implying that measures  de-
signed to control the level and volatility of international  flows act as deterrents to foreign
direct  investment.
Finally,  we turn to estimation of the coefficients of the latent  global factor,  allowing
the effects of the latter to vary across countries.  Unlike the estimations presented  so far,
this poses a nonlinear problem due to the presence  of cross-equation  restrictions  forcing
the relative  magnitude of the coefficients  on the six global  variables  to be the same for
all countries - although their absolute magnitude  may differ  across  countries.
The  results  of this  model  are  shown  in  the last  column  of Table  7.  To  make  the
estimation  results  more  easily  comparable  with  those  from  previous  specifications,  we
24constrained  the coefficients  on  the  global  variables  to add up to -0.010  while leaving
unrestricted  the country-specific  coefficient  on the resulting linear combination  of global
variables.  For want of a better term, we  label such coefficient  'global effect'.  To make
the estimation results easier to understand,  note that the estimated impact of any global
variable on FDI flows to a particular  country is given by the 'global effect' of such country
times the coefficient  on the global variable  in question.
It  can be seen from the table that all of the global variables,  with the only exception
of the stock market return, carry significantly  negative coefficients.  In turn, the average
of the global  effect  across  countries is close  to unity  and strongly  significant.  Yet  the
estimates of the global effect display substantial variation across countries:  62 are positive
(of which  23  significant  at  the  10  percent  level  or  better)  and  32  negative  (of which
2  significant).  As  for  the  local variables,  the  size  and  significance  of their  coefficient
estimates are remarkably similar to those reported from the estimation of Model  2 in the
first column ofT able 4.
4  Final Remarks and Policy Implications
This paper presents strong evidence  that the large increases in foreign direct investment
flows  and  its distribution across  countries  are  associated  with increased  importance  of
global  factors  among  industrial and  developing  countries.  This increased  relevance  of
global factors is associated with an increased  integration of world capital markets follow-
ing the many reforms  and liberalization  programs of the mid 1980's and 1990's.
Our results  complement those  of papers  that find increases  in the extent  of integra-
tion (mainly)  after  1990 by studying the behavior of equity returns in several emerging
markets.  Unique to our paper is the analysis of the integration by looking at capital flows
as opposed  to prices  and by  describing  the process  of integration  for emerging  as  well
as developed  economies.  Carrieri,  Errunza  and Hogan  (2002)  show that  in the 1990s,
significantly  more of the variation in returns of 'ineligible'  domestic securities can be ex-
plained  by the world return.  Similarly,  Bekaert,  Harvey and Ng (2002) find that equity
25returns  display  greater  correlation  with regional  and world  market  returns  after  1990,
and Bekaert  and Harvey  (1997)  show that global factors (characterized  by a similar set
of variables  as used in this paper)  have  become more  important  after liberalizations  in
explaining stock return volatility in emerging  markets.
The paper also makes a contribution to the literature on the determinants  of foreign
direct investment.  We develop theoretical  arguments and motivate extensively the pres-
ence of global  factors  as drivers  of foreign  direct  investment.  The increased  exposure
to  global  factors that we  find is associated  with increased flows of foreign  direct invest-
ment  into  emerging  market  economies.  While these  findings constitute  evidence  of the
relevance  of global or  external  factors  for foreign  direct  investment,  we  also  find that
growth  in local productivity,  trade  openness,  financial  depth,  low  government  burden,
and macroeconomic  stability  are important domestic  drivers.
The finding that local factors  have become less important  in accounting  for the vari-
ation  in foreign direct investment  should not be seen as an endorsement  for an hands-off
attitude of local governments  towards foreign  investment.  Much to the contrary.  First,
our  empirical  model explains  roughly  50  percent  of the  cross  sectional  and time  series.
variation in foreign direct investment.  It could be that some of the remaining  variance  in
direct investment is coming  from local  factors that  we  are omitting and that are largely
uncorrelated  with  global  factors.  Though  we  find  this hypothesis  unlikely  due  to the
extensive  list of variables that we  use,  we cannot completely  rule  it out.  Second, local
factors  still account  for a sizeable  amount  of variation  in foreign  direct investment  even
after excluding  the component that is due  to the correlation  ofl ocal and global factors.
Disregarding  their role  could  turn sour particularly  in crisis  periods.  It is during  crisis
periods that the characteristics  of local factors  can  be determinant  to prevent  massive
outflows.  Third,  and related to the points above, the dynamics  of foreign  capital  inflows
will almost  always involve  a cross country  comparison  leading to a selection  that in it-
self  is  mainly  driven by  a direct comparison  of local  factors  and  possibly  also  by  how
these local  factors relate to the multinational's  own global  risk factors.  Finally,  much of
26the integration  of capital markets  comes from  policy initiatives taken from within each
country.  In many emerging economies, the defense  of existing reforms and the pursuit of
further  liberalization policies  represents  a challenge for local  policy  makers that cannot
be put off.
27A  Global and Local Factors in Foreign Direct Invest-
ment:  Case Studies
There is considerable  evidence that multinationals  make investment, financing,  and cash
management decisions at the parent company level.  Tests have found that, controlling for
local variables,  domestic investment responds to changes  in such variables as the parent
company's  aggregate supply  ofl iquidity,  aggregate debt to equity ratios,  and worldwide
cost  of capital and  hurdle rates.22  For example,  Mills  and Newberry  (2002)  show that
worldwide tax incentives  have led subsidiaries  to shift  income  into the US  during  1987-
1996 by changing their subsidiaries'  leverage.
In this paper,h owever,  we inspect the role  of global  factors  which, being outside the
control of the multinational,  are the drivers of the parent  company's aggregate variables.
This section discusses three cases of direct investments  of multinationals  highlighting the
role of global and local factors in the decision making process.  We view this presentation
as particularly interesting since the foreign direct  investment literature  has not identified
any role for global  factors  up to now,  which is reflected in the way  empirical analysis  is
conducted.
Enron International's  Dhabol Power Project, India 23
The  Dhabol  Power  Project  consisted  of  a2  ,OOOm  egawatt  power  station  located
at Dhabol,  near  Bombay.  It  amounted  to  a $2.8  billion  investment  from  a joint ven-
ture formed  by the  US  energy  giant  Enron Corporation  (with  79.93  percent  of equity
stake),  Bechtel  Enterprises  Inc.  and  General  Electric's  Financial  Services  (each  with
equal shares).  Construction was expected to start in mid-year  1995  and was expected to
be completed  by December  of 1998.
The  global factors:  A  country's  energy  sector  is  very  dependent  on  the domestic
business cycle.  Thus,  Enron viewed its strategy of foreign expansion as a way to diversify
22The interested  reader  is referred to  Caves  (1996,  pp  137-140).
23This discussion  is based  on Eun and  Resnick  (2001)  and in several newspaper  articles obtained  from
the database  Lexis-Nexis.
28risks inherent  with  fluctuations  in the  US business  cyde.  At the time  Enron  was  also
moving into other markets like Bolivia, Brazil,  and Italy.  A second  global factor was that
Enron was doing very well in the US and enjoyed easy access to credit from a booming US
economy.  A third global/regional factor was that, while the project came as an invitation
from the Indian government,  it provided a client for Enron's  Qatar $5  billion project to
develop  natural gas reserves.
The Local Factors: India's proximity to the Qatar project is itself also a local favorable
factor.  Another  local favorable  factor for Enron  was  that India had  an energy  deficit,
which guaranteed  demand for the product.  The main risks faced  by Enron were political
in nature.  First,  India  revealed  itself as  a labyrinth  of bureaucracy  to Enron.  Second,
after long negotiations  with the central Indian government,  and shortly after construction
began in 1995, the newly elected provincial government of the state of Maharastra (where
Dhabol  is located)  stopped construction.  The provincial  government  demanded  a say in
the deal discussing  among other things the pricing of electricity,  the  amount purchased
by its state, and environmental concerns.  The project did go ahead,  but renewed disputes
about tariffs with the state of Maharastra  in 2001 forced its shutting down.  By this time,
Enron had invested $1  billion and was  looking for a buyer.
Intel Investment, C osta Rica24
In  1996  Intel  announced  plans to  build  an  assembly-and-test  semiconductor  plant
worth $300  million in Costa  Rica.  In contrast with Enron's case above,  Costa Rica was
not- viewed as a market itself and all of the o.utput  from  this factory was to be exported
to other countries.
Global factors:  Intel's  decision  to expand  production  sites  is  related  to  its  role  as
primary supplier and developer  of semiconductors  worldwide.  The pace oft echnological
cloning  in semiconductors  dictates  that  Intel  must have  a one  or  two year  advantage
over  its competitors  in order to recover the research and development  costs in the  new
24This discussion  is based on  Spar (1998).
29computer chip.  Thus, it is critical that Intel can produce  quickly enough a large amount
of computer chips.  Since  upgrading  existing plants  itself takes  time, Intel has had the
policy of building  new factories  "every nine  months  or so'  (Spar  1998,  pp.  4).  Thus,  it
is the  pace of worldwide  growth  and overall demand  for processors  that dictate Intel's
expansion decisions.
Local factors: Intel favored Costa Rica out of an original list of 12 candidate countries
including  Brazil,  Mexico,  Chile,  Thailand,  and Indonesia.  First,  Costa Rica displayed
an established  and  trustworthy  political system.  Second,  Costa Rica had a non-union
work  environment  with  a reasonable  supply  of qualified  workers.25 Third,  Costa Rica
presented  itself as a pro-business environment  and granted Intel with a fast track permit
process that was  critical  to acceptance.  Last,  but  not least,  (though  Intel did not get
any special  tax treatment  relative  to other  foreign  investors,)  the  8 year  exemption of
corporate taxes and subsequent 4 year reduction of the tax rate in 50 percent represented
significant  savings  for  Intel.  Other  concessions  to Intel  included  reduced  energy  rates
(through changes in the industrial rate structure) and improved  access to the airport  and
airport facilities.
Johnson & Johnson,  U.S.A.26
In this last  case  study  we  look  into a disinvestment  decision  made  by Johnson  &
Johnson  (J&J)  in  1998.  Accordingt  o J&J  this  decision  fundamentally  changed  the
nature of its worldwide manufacturing  operations, reducing the number of manufacturing
facilities  around  the world  by  36  plants,  from  159  tol  23  plants,  with  a subsequent
decrease of 4 percent of the global  work force.  One thing that is interesting in this case
study is that nothing changed  at the localf actor level to alter or initiate J&J's decision.
Global factors:  "The most  significant reconfiguration  of facilities  in the Company's
history,"  (J&J  1998  Annual  Report,  pp.  1)  could  only have made  sense in a more  in-
25Apparently  labor market conditions  and the  recent currency crisis were the dedding factor between
Mexico  and Costa  Rica.
26This presentation  is  based on the company's  1998 and 1999 annual  reports.
30tegrated  world.  According  to J&J,  the worldwide  decrease  in transportation  costs  and
lowering of trade  barriers  made production in several countries  economically  infeasible.
Therefore,  J&J's new  strategy was to move production  from a local to a regional  con-
figuration,  taking advantage  of scale  economies  and  low transportation  costs.  Clearly,
the decrease  in transportation  costs is due to worldwide technological  improvements.  As
for the  worldwide  movement  to lower  tariffs,  we  argue  that  it  too  is driven  by  global
factors.  Perhaps  the most  important  of these factors  is  the increased  belief  (resulting
from advances  in  economic science)  that lowering tariffs  is a necessary  condition to bol-
ster growth.  Of course,  the decision ofw hich countries to abandon must nevertheless be
confronted  with  local  factors  that relate to geography,  labor costs,  tax benefits,  and so
on.
B  A Simple Model of Foreign  Direct Investment
In this  appendix  we  elaborate  a simple  model  of foreign  direct investment.  Consider
the investment  decision problem of a domestic subsidiary  of a multinational  corporation
(subsidiary  for short).  The subsidiary  is assumed  to be fully  owned and financed by the
parent company.  For simplicity the subsidiary lives for 2 periods, t and t +  1.27  In period
t investment It is chosen.  In period  t +  1, the productivity  shock At+li  s realized,  labor
Lt+ 1 is chosen and production  takes place.  Prices are taken as given.  There is a unique
good  produced  domestically and all quantities  are expressed in units of this good.  The
domestic consumption good  differs from the foreign good available for consumption and
investment by the  foreign investor.
The multinational discounts  profits  from the domestic subsidiary  7rt+l  using the dis-
count rate 'Bt+,.28  This discount rate is measured  in units of the foreign good  and hence
profits  received  from  the subsidiary  must  be adjusted  to reflect changes in the relative
271t  is  straightforward  toc  onsider  an  infinitely  lived  firm.  In this  case  we  can  solve the first  order
conditions  using a linear approximation.  The results from this approximation  are similar to our current
setup, but the details  are more involved.
21The discount  rate or  stochastic discount  factor  in  the Consumption-CAPM  model  equals the  in-
tertemporal rate of substitution.
31price of the foreign good or real exchange rate xt.  The expected discounted profits  of the
local subsidiary in units of the foreign  good are:
Vt = max { -xtRtIt + Et [Pt+113t+ 1 Xt+iirt+l] },
where
7rt+1  = imax [At+uILtta  - wt+iLt+l  I
1 >  y  + a which leads to economic profits to pay for fixed intangible assets owned by the
foreign investors,  Rt = 1  +  rt is the gross rate of interest for the multinational  measured
in local currency  units, wt+l  is the real wage rate, Pt+1 is the stochastic probability of no
expropriation,  and Vt  is the value of the investment at time t.
The maximization  problem described above yields the following first order  condition
for investment  (after incorporating the optimnality condition for labor):
Rt =  a'/(l'')  ( 1 - 'Et  [Pt+Ift+1Xt+A-1AiAL-a)  (4)
The right hand side of (4)  gives the marginal  oost of an additional  unit of investment in
local currency units.  This cost  is equated to the expected  marginal benefit of investing
which  is accrued  through additional output in period t +  1.
To solve for optimal investment assume that all variables are log-normally distributed
with multivariate autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.29 Let Zt+1 = [lnpt+i, ln)t+,,
lnh,lnAt+i,lnwt+i]'.  Then:
Zt+I  =  eZt  +Et+i,  et+, - N (O, St),I
Et  =  CO +  CqetetCi,
with e being a diagonal  matrix,  and  Et being a variance-covariance  matrix  of shocks.
Note that through Et shocks to the discount factor can be correlated  with shocks to local
29Clearly assuming that pt  is  log-normally  distributed  is not reasonable  since Pt > 1 is not legitimate
for  a  probability.  However,  provided  the  likelihood  that  Pt  >  1 is very  small  this  is  ar  easonable
approximation.
32variables.  The solution  to the first order equation is:
a1-a-y  1
I-a  InI  =  co+2azta+pP  lnpt+pfiln/ 3 t
1 - a  2xt.  1  - +p  lIn  t  +  PA  lniAt_  1P-  a!InwUt-  ln R,  (5)
where co is a constant, the p's are the persistent parameters in e, and a =  [1, 1, 1, 1/ (1 - a),
cx/ (a - 1)]'.  Note that  because  of conditional  hetercskedasticity  of e, investment  is  a
linear  function  of lagged  variances  of the shocks.  We  allow  for this  possibility in  our
estimations.
This completes  the  analysis of investment  decisions  of a single  subsidiary.  Assume
now that the domestic economy is composed of many identical firms and that every period
new firms enter into this market,  overlapping  with firms already  in place.  An aggregate
version  of (5)  holds  for  the  economy  as  a whole  provided  all foreign  subsidiaries  face
similar prices,  productivity and discount  factors, which we assume.
C  Definition ofV ariables
Here  we  provide  ad etailed  description  of the data.  Unless  noted  we  use  an annual
frequency.
Foreign  Direct  Investment/GDP:  Ratio  of Gross  FDI inflows  (in current  US$)
toG  DP  (in  current  US$).  IMF  Balance  of Payments  and The  World  Bank  Global
Development  Finance.
T-Bill:  US 3-month Treasury  Bill rate taken from Bloomberg.  Frequency:  annual
average  (end of month price).
Stock Market Return: Percentage  change of Morgan Stanley World Capital Index
from Bloomberg.  Frequency:  annual average (end of month price).
Slope:  Slope  of the  US  Term Structure  from Bloomberg,  computed  as the 10 year
Bond rate  minus 3-month Treasury  Bill rate.  Frequency:  annual  average  (end of month
price).
Spread:  US Credit Spread from  Bloomberg,  computed  as Moody's  AAA bond rate
minus Moody's  BAA bond rate.  Frequency:  annual average (end of month price).
U.S.  inflation rate:  Geometric average  of current and last-year  inflation rate.  IMF
International  Financial  Statistics.
World  Growth:  GDP weighted  average of GDP growth  rate (sample  of countries
with complete data).  World Development  Indicators.
33GDP  growth:  Growth  rate  of real per capita GDP.  Summers  and Heston dataset
and World Development  Indicators.
Trade openness:  Residual of a regression of the log of the ratio ofr eal exports  plus
imports  (in  1995  US$)  to real GDP  (in  1995 US$)  on  the logs of area  and population,
and dummies for oil exporting  and for landlocked countries  (see Loayza, Fajnzylber,  and
Calder6n  2002).  World  Development  Indicators.
Financial Depth:  Ratio  of private  credit  by deposit  banks  and other  financial  in-
stitutions to GDP  (Beck,  Levine, and Demirguc-Kunt  2000).
Govermnent consumption:  Ratio of general government  final consumption  expen-
diture to GDP. World Development  Indicators.
Institutional quality:  Civil  liberties  (0,1).  Higher  scores  indicate  more liberties.
Freedom  House:  Freedom  in the World.
REER  growth:  Growth  rate  of  real  effective  exchange  rate.  IMF  International
Financial Statistics.
REER  volatility:  Standard  deviation  of real  effective  exchange  rate  percentage
changes.  IMF International  Financial  Statistics.
GDP  growth volatility:  Standard deviation of growth rate of real per capita GDP.
Summers  and Heston dataset and World Development  Indicators.
Terms of Trade volatility:  Standard deviation of terms of trade percentage changes.
World  Development  Indicators.
Wages:  Average  annual  rate  of wages  and  salaries  in  the  manufacturings  ector,
expressed  in constant  1995  US$.  United Nations:  Industrial Development  Organization.
Traded Value to GDP:  Ratio of total  shares traded on the stock market exchange
to GDP  (Beck,  Levine,  and Demirguc-Kunt  2000).
Official  liberalization:  Dummy variable  that takes the  value of one if the equity
market is  liberalized  based on the  chronology in Bekaert  and Harvey  (2000).
First sign:  Dummy variable  that takes  the value of one  if there is either  an official
liberalization or ADR and country funid introduction.
Investability:  Ratio of capitalization  of the IFC  "investable"  to the "global"  stocks
in a country as in Edison  and Warnock  (2001).
Balance of Payments Restrictions: Simple average of (0,1) scores for the following
categories  of balance of payments restrictions:  multiple exchange rate practices,c  urrent-
account  restrictions, capital-account  restrictions,  and surrender of export  proceeds.  IMF
Exchange  Arrangements  and Exchange  Restrictions.
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YearsTable  1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable  Mean  Median  Dtd dev  Minimum  Maximum
FDI/GDP  0.018  0.010  0.027  -0.122  0.316
T-Bill rate  6.288  5.825  2.245  3.019  14.078
Stock market return  12.463  13.366  13.283  -21.907  51.769
Yield curve slope  1.835  2.155  1.039  -0.318  3.550
Credit spread  1.068  0.945  0.409  0.603  2.326
U.S. Inflation  4.258  3.605  2.319  1.335  9.254
World growth  0.032  0.032  0.013  0.006  0.066
Global  -0.085  -0.206  0.708  -1.076  1.667
GDP growth  0.021  0.026  0.050  -0.365  0.319
Trade openness  0.021  0.053  0.505  -1.697  1.542
Financial depth  0.433  0.287  0.378  0.011  2.290
Government consumption  0.155  0.145  0.060  0.030  0.460
REER growth  0.005  0.006  0.116  -0.706  1.230
Institutional quality  0.595  0.670  0.304  0  1
REER volatility  0.084  0.059  0.079  0.003  0.728
GDP growth  volatility  0.037  0.028  0.031  0.002  0.393
ToT volatility  0.089  0.064  0.090  0  0.807
45Table 2: Determinants  of FEN.  Multiple Global and Local Variables.
Model  1: Homogeneous-slope coefficients and country-specific Intercepts.
Variable  All countries  Industrial countries  Developing countries
T-Bill  -0.0013  -0.0015 *  -0.0013  **
0.0003  0.0007  0.0004
Stock Market Retum  2.38E-05  3.78E-06  2.34E-05
3.62E-05  3.70E-05  4.79E-05
Slope  -0.0035  -0.0035  -0.0034
0.0006  0.0013  0.0007
Spread  0.0003  0.0070  -0.0018
0.0026  0.0054  0.0031
U.S.  Inflation  -0.0006  *  -0.0006  -0.0005
0.0003  0.0005  0.0004
World Growth  -0.0961  -0.1046  -0.0970
0.0382  0.0750  0.0467
GDP growth  0.0350  0.0732  0.0317
0.0134  0.0266  0.0143
Trade openness  0.0115  0.0238 *-  0.0101
0.0026  0.0090  0.0027
Financial depth  0.0075 *  -0.0003  0.0137 **
0.0031  0.0044  0.0048
Govemment consumption  -0.0709 **  -0.1551  *  -0.0659 **
0.0228  0.0563  0.0250
REER growth  -0.0012  -0.0080  -0.0001
0.0039  0.0068  0.0043
Institutional quality  0.0018  0.0086  -0.0005
0.0030  0.0053  0.0035
REER volatility  -0.0081  -0.0024  -0.0079
0.0070  0.0147  0.0077
GDP growth volatility  -0.0976  -0.0412  -0.0936
0.0206  0.0626  0.0212
ToT volatility  -0.0021  0.0262  -0.0014
0.0112  0.0203  0.0116
# Observations  1926  482  1444
# Countries  94  20  74
R-squared total  0.4456  0.3935  0.4646
R-squared within  0.1341  0.2319  0.0947
Notes:
Standard errors  in italics, below the corresponding coefficient estimate.
(*)  5% significance level and (-) 10%  significance level.
46Table 3: Determinants of FDI. Synthetic Global Factor and Multiple Local Variables.
Model 1: Homogeneous slope coefficIents and country-speclflc Intercepts.
Variable  All countries  Industrial countries  Developing countries
Global Factor  -0.0053  -0.0015  -0.0061
0.0009  0.0012  0.0011
GDP growth  0.0318  0.0280  0.0306
0.0134  0.0223  0.0143
Trade openness  0.0126 **  0.0278 **  0.0110
0.0025  0.0079  0.0026
Financial depth  0.0075  -0.0016  0.0137
0.0031  - 0.0037  0.0048
Govemment consumption  -0.0726  **  - -0.1998 **  -0.0646
0.0231  0.0648  0.0250
REER growth  -0.0009  -0.0078  0.0003
0.0037.  0.0061  0.0040
Institutional quality  0.0021  0.0084  -0.0003
0.0029  0.0053  0.0034
REER volatility  -0.0083  -0.0052  -0.0086
0.0069;  0.0144  0.0075
GDP growth volatility  -0.1026  -0.0893  -0.0972
0.0212  0.0611  0.0217
ToT volatility  -0.0029  0.0391  -0.0014
0.0108  0.0208  0.0112
# Observations  1926  482  1444
# Countries  94  20  74
R-squared total  0.4388  0.3710  0.4453
R-squared within  0.1235  0.2035  0.1188
Notes:
Standard errors in  italics, below the corresponding coefficient estimate
(*)  5%  significance level and (*) 10%  significance level.
47Table 4: Detrminants of FDI. SyntheUc Global Factor and Multiple Local Variables.
Model 2: Heterogeneous global factor coefficients and country-specific Intercepts.
VaHable  WcrldMaketIn  gaiMnlfforldMaketln  h I ulodLtasrldMaketIn
fodFTGIlD kdeWc  -0.0069 - -0.0018  -0.0078
0.0026  0.0020  0.0035
ff  vrsedRkA  0.0268  0.0198  0.0268
0.0103  0.0315  0.0115
beTilrdLIaTnn  0.0198  0.0330  0.0182
0.0028  0.0058  0.0033
Dt&TaIt¶iLkA  0.0020  -0.0085 ^  0.0077
0.0038  0.0045  0.0053
fdu  IeaqlakrldanMqLktda  -0.0431  ^  -0.1714  -0.0352
0.0239  0.0612  0.0273
NmnNrseiRkA  -0.0010  -0.0097  -0.0002
0.0040  0.0089  0.0046
ganktkMW&iqyMTbt  0.0016  0.0035  0.0013
0.0036  0.0062  0.0043
NmnNrudoTt  -0.0098  -0.0037  -0.0098
0.0082  0.0216  0.0093
ff  vrsedRkAnikt&z  -0.1009  -0.1154  -0.0965
0.0201  0.0696  0.0223
bdb nidtrktkz  -0.0162  0.0162  -0.0153
0.0076  0.0365  0.0084
# Observations  1926  482  1444
# Countries  94  20  74
R-squared total  0.6897  0.6538  0.6959
Notes:
a/ Mean of the country-specific estimates
Standard  errors in Italics, below the corresponding coeffident estimate
()  5% signIfcance level and (^) 10%  significance level.
48Table 5:  Globalization Measure
Share of explained FDI variance by global and local variables
Globalization measure  R-square al  R-square within al
Year  Ali countries  Developing countries  Industrial countries
1985  0.073  0.069  0.154  0.398  0.064
1986  0.075  0.080  0.129  0.423  0.072
1987  0.039  0.042  0.059  0.470  0.083
1988  0.017  0.019  0.014  0.511  0.097
1989  0.054  0.043  0.152  0.517  0.108
1990  0.136  0.111  0.317  0.580  0.129
1991  0.130  0.112  0.277  0.631  0.115
1992  0.186  0.161  0.354  0.599  0.098
1993  0.233  0.210  0.412  0.599  0.105
1994  0.481  0.457  0.624  0.592  0.105
1995  0.459  0.449  0.522  0.550  0.122
1996  0.508  0.500  0.591  0.522  0.124
1997  0.412  0.401  0.492  0.509  0.141
1998  0.517  0.496  0.662  0.512  0.168
1999  0.622  0.599  0.783  0.500  0.162
Note:
at R-squares computed using the sample of all countries.Table 6: Global Factors and Liberalization
Slope coefficient of regressing the globalization measure on a liberalization variable
Balance of
Official Uberalization  First Sign  Investability  Payments Restrictions
All Countries  2.98a **  3.42 **  3.93  -0.91
0.585'b  1.088  1.062  0.180
0.652/c  0.399  0.566  0.747
Industrial Countries  31.40  31.40 **  32.65  -0.94
10.08  10.08  13.27  0.182
0.157  0.157  0.178  0.602
Developing Countries  0.47  0.64 **  0.70  *  -0.42
0.072  0.165  0.120  0.073
0.692  0.485  0.718  0.723
Latin America  0.43  **  0.52  **  0.54 **  -0.28
0.079  0.167  0.117  0.053
0.603  0.303  0.659  0.761
Asia  0.52 **  0.72 **  1.16 **  -0.07
0.090  0.237  0.289  0.619
0.676  0.364  0.673  0.002
Notes:
a/  Slope coefficient.
b/  Robust standard error.
c/ R-squared.
(**) 5%  significance level and (*) 10% significance level.Table 7:  Determinants  of FDI.  Extensions.
Homogeneous slope coefficients and country-speciflc Intercepts  Heterogeneous  slope
Variable  Wages  Traded Value  Privatfzations  BOP  coefficients on global
to GDP  Restrictions  factor
T-Bill  -0.0012  *  0.0004  4.0013 - 40.0005 *  -0.0007
0.0004  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003
Stock Market Retum  -4.26E-06  -4.20E-05  *  4.47E-05  1.22E-05  -2.62E-05
3.81E-05  2.53E-05  3.64E-05  3.49E-05  Z 17E-05
Slope  -0.0030-  -0.0007  -0.0037  - -0.0017  -0.0031
0.0007  0.0006  0.0006  0.0006  0.0006
Spread  0.0036  -0.0050  0.0024  -0.0040  *  -0.0031
0.0028  0.0019  0.0027  0.0023  0.0011
U.S.  Inflation  -0.0004  -.0009  4.0003  -0.0001  -0.0013
0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003
World Growth  -0.0651  -0.1522  -0.0377  -0.0666  -0.1703
0.0470  0.0433  0.0414  0.0387  0.0214
GDP  growth  0.0398 *  0.0345  0.0317  *  0.0332 *  0.0285
0.0179  0.0112  0.0133  0.0136  0.0100
Trade openness  0.0117  - 0.0009  0.0096 *  0.0059  - 0.0163
0.0032  0.0033  0.0026  0.0025  0.0029
Financial depth  0.0106  *  -0.0025  0.0060  0.0067 *  -0.0010
0.0037  0.0020  0.0030  0.0026  0.0039
Govemment  consumption  -0.1049  *  -0.0780  -0.0777  -0.0730  *  -0.0556
0.0284  0.0239  0.0226  0.0233  0.0236
REER growth  0.0009  0.0004  -0.0014  -0.0001  -0.0008
0.0042  0.0050  0.0038  0.0038  0.0039
Insfitutional quality  0.0058  0.0073 *  0.0018  0.001  -0.0001
0.0034  0.0030  0.0030  0.0028  0.0036
REER  volatility  -0.0077  0.0074  -0.0082  0.0039  -0.0099
0.0085  0.0072  0.0070  0.0066  0.0081
GDP  growth volatility  40.1174 *  -0.1427  - -0.0945  -0.0890  -0.1004
0.0315  0.0295  0.0208  0.0232  0.0201
ToT volatility  -0.0096  -0.0125  0.0015  -0.0054  -0.0149
0.0100  0.0139  0.0112  0.0113  0.0077
Wages  -1.21E-07  *
5.90E-07
Traded  Value to GDP  0.0057*
0.0026
Privatizations  0.0075  -
0.0018
BoP Restrictions  -0.0015
0.0006
Global effect a /  1.0669
__  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _ _  _  _  0.2134
#  Observations  1215  939  1926  1743  1926
#  Countries  64  70  94  88  94
R-squared total  0.3794  0.6311  0.4815  0.4671  0.6975
R-squared within  0.1768  0.2619  0.1434  0.1014  n.s.
Notes:
Standard errors in italics, below the corresponding  coefficient estimate
a/ Average of country specific coefficients
(-) 5%  significance level  and (-)  10%  significance level.
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